

5. Other Cryptographic Constructions Relying on Coding Theory

- Code-Based Digital Signatures
- The Courtois-Finiasz-Sendrier (CFS) Construction
- Attacks against the CFS Scheme
- Parallel-CFS
- Stern's Zero-Knowledge Identification Scheme
- An Efficient Provably Secure One-Way Function
- **The Fast Syndrome-Based (FSB) Hash Function**

Requirements for a Cryptographic Hash Function

A cryptographic hash function has the following properties:

- its input can be of **arbitrary size**
- its output is a hash of **fixed size**
- from a security point of view, it should be hard to:
 - find an input with a given hash (**preimage** attack)
 - find an input with the same hash as a given input (**second preimage**)
 - find two inputs with the same hash (**collision** attack)

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In addition, it should, as much as possible:


- be fast in both **software** and **hardware** implementations
- be fast for both **small** and **large inputs**
- have a **compact** description

Building a Cryptographic Hash Function

Building a function with arbitrary input length is tricky

→ usually, iterate a function with fixed input size on blocks of the input

The Merkle-Damgård Construction



One of the first hash function constructions:


- f is a **compression function**
- easy to understand, simple security proofs

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The Davies-Meyer Construction



Ideal for compact implementations:


- E is a **block cipher**
- can reuse the same hardware

Building a Cryptographic Hash Function

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The Sponge Construction



- Maximum versatility

absorb | squeeze out

Overview of the Fast Syndrome-Based Hash Function

Uses the Merkle-Damgård construction.


Allows simple security analysis:

- properties of the compression function are transferred to the hash function
 - preimage resistance
 - second preimage resistance
 - collision resistance
- analyse only the compression function
- has some drawbacks, but not so problematic:
 - long message collisions, multi-collisions...

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Uses the **Merkle-Damgård construction**.

Uses the **one-way function** (previous session) with compression parameters.




Overview of the Fast Syndrome-Based Hash Function

Uses the **Merkle-Damgård construction**.

Uses the **one-way function** (previous session) with compression parameters.

Adds a **final compression function**.



Description of FSB₂₅₆

Compression function:

- the matrix H is of size $r = 1024$ by $n = 2^{21}$
- the input of $s = 1792$ bits is encoded into a regular word of weight $w = 128$
→ each position is coded on $\frac{s}{w} = \log \frac{n}{w} = 14$ bits
- the output of $r = 1024$ bits is the XOR of 128 columns of H

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Chaining:

- the message to hash is split in blocks of $s - r = 768$ bits
- a padding is added to get an integer number of blocks
 - includes the message length
- the IV is all 0
- the compression function is iterated on the blocks
- the final output of $r = 1024$ bits is input to Whirlpool
 - the final hash has 256 bits


Security of the Compression Function

Against (second) preimage:

- solve a regular instance of SD with **weight 128** and a 1024×2^{21} matrix
- best attack: **GBA** with complexity $2^{261} > 2^{256}$

Against collision:

- solve a regular instance of SD with **weight 256** and a 1024×2^{21} matrix
- best attack: **ISD** with complexity $2^{153} > 2^{128}$



Need for a Final Compression Function

A hash function is expected to have the following properties:

- a security of $2^{\frac{r}{2}}$ **against collisions** for an output of r bits
 - this is the cost of a generic attack using a birthday algorithm
- it should be possible to **truncate the output** without losing security

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This is not the case for the compression function of FSB:

- if w allows compression, GBA with 4 lists is always possible on weight $2w$
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- truncating the output directly improves GBA/ISD attacks
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Simply add a final compression:

- must be non-linear
- does not have to be collision/preimage resistant

Efficiency

Hashing speed:

- each 14 bits of input add a 1024 bit XOR
 - theoretically, could be as low as 10 cycles per byte (a 64 bit XOR per cycle)
- in practice, requires **300 cycles per input byte**
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Size of the description:

- H has a size of $2^{10} \times 2^{21}$ bits, that is **256 MB**
 - this is way too much!
- instead a **quasi-cyclic matrix** is used
 - each 1024×1024 block is circulant
- only the first line of the matrix is needed
 - the description is 1024 times smaller: **256 kB**

5. Other Cryptographic Constructions Relying on Coding Theory

We have seen several constructions relying on the **hardness of Syndrome Decoding**:

- McEliece, Niederreiter
- the CFS signature
- Stern's identification scheme
- the FSB hash function

Many other applications of **coding theory** in cryptography:

- secret sharing
- linear diffusion in block ciphers
- fingerprinting and traitor tracing
- private information retrieval